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1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Fourteen aircraft either attempted to land or landed on nm.way 22-L of John 
F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) during a 25-min period on June 24, 1975. 
This was between 1944 and 2009 GMT (3:44 and 4:09 PM Local Time) when thunder-
showers were in progress in the New York City area. 
At 1956 GMT a DC-8 experienced considerable difficulty in landing after 
encountering a strong crosswinq shear near the approach end. The next flight, an 
L-1011 airplane, abandoned the approach because it was pushed down and drifted to 
the right during the critical period. 1\vo flights then landed without incident. Finally, 
a B-727 descended normally on the glideslope down to 400 ft where it encountered 
heavy rain. The downdraft in the rain was so strong that the aircraft contacted the 
approach lights, 2,400 ft short of the runway. 
Detailed examination of meteorological conditions revealed that the growth 
rate of the JFK Thunderstorm was at its peak when the accident occurred. The radar 
echo of the storm appeared as a spea~h~ad moyi~g faster tha:i:i, any other echo in the 
vicinity._ Hidden in the spearhead echo were four to five cells of intense downdrafts 
which are to be called "downburst cells". Apparently, those aircraft which flew 
through the cells encountered considerable difficulties in landing, while_ others landed 
between the cells without even noticing the danger areas on both sides of the approach 
path. 
Extensive analyses of satellite, radar, and synoptic data were performed, 
leading to the establishment of a model of the spearhead storm and downburst cells. 
The responses of aircraft in downburs t cells were then examined in detail. This has 
led to the conclusion that a plane can be seriously affected by crosswind shear, head-
wind or tailwind shear, and a downburst of air current. 
At the present time, there is no way of predicting the occurrence of these 
phenomena both in time and space. Additional anemometers at and around the major 
airports and better real time assessment of wind and radar data, coupled with. know-
ledge of these small but violent downbursts, will be of great help in the future for 
minimizing accidents of this nature. 
2. SATELLITE DA TA 
The life history of the JFK Thunderstorm was depicted by the infrared.and 
visible images of SMS-1, a geostationary satellite positioned above the equator at 
0 • 
75 W longitude. A pair of IR and visible pictures at 30-minute intervals is available. 
The satellite imagery closest to 2005 GMT, the accident time, was obtained· 
at about 2003 GMT. Unfortunately, the image had been transmitted with coastlines 
and state boundaries in dots which cannot be removed from the image. An attempt 
was made to superimpose the precise coastlines so as to determine the three-dimen-
sional features of the JFK Thunderstorm at the time of the accident (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Visible picture of the JFK Thunderstorm at 2003 GMT, about 
2 minutes before the aircraft accident. An inverted T symbol is 
the projected length of a 45,000-ft high, imaginary pole at JFK as 
seen from the satellite.. The .image of a c;:loud at 45, 000 ft will 
shift northward as much as the length of the pole in this figure. 
There are two distinct shadows to the east of the anvil clouds spreading out 
from the storm tops. Another important feature of the storm is an arc cloud 
extending west to east along the south coast of Long Island through the JFK Airport. 
Usually an arc cloud expands rapidly out from the storm area. The existence of a sea 
breeze, however, prevented the southward advance of the arc cloud beyond the JFK 
Airport (Figure 2 ). 
The height of the anvil cloud to the northeast of JFK was 41, 000 ft. The other 
anvil to the north was 43, 000 ft high. These heights were computed from the cloud-
2 
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Figure 2. Schematic view of the JFK Thunderstorm drawn on the basis 
of the geostationary satellite data. The circle identified as JFK 
is the location of the airport. An arc cloud is seen just to the . 
south of the thunderstorm activity. Its southward advancement is 
prevented by the sea breeze. The arrowhead vectors denote the 
cloud motion in knots. 
shadow relationship. As indicated by the arrows, the spreading rate of the anvils 
was about 30 kts toward the east-northeast. 
The precursor of the JFK Thunderstorm was the cumulus line A- B seen in 
northern New Jersey at 1703 GMT (Figure 3). Within 30 minutes, the west end of the 
cumulus line grew explosively into a towering cumulus (Figure 4). The growth con-
tinued to 1803 GMT when the west end, A , became overwhelmingly larger than the 
east end, B (Figure 5). The visible picture·, taken simultaneously, shows a small 
hole at the center of cloud A. 
At 1833 GMT, the north end of cloud A displayed a small bulge (Figure 6). 
The corresponding visible picture implies that an anvil had already started forming. 
Within the next 30 minutes the anvil of cloud A grew rapidly (Figure 7). 
At 1933 GMT, just about 30 minutes before the accident, a light-grey area 
appeared inside cloud A. the equivalent blackbody temperature at the boundary of 
this area was -44 °C (Figure 8). The simultaneous visible picture reveals the 
formation of an arc cloud along the south edge of cloud A. 
Figure 3. A cumulus line A -B in northern New Jersey. The line was 
a precursor of the JFK Thunderstorm. Infrared picture at 1703 GMT. 
Figure 4. IR picture at 1733 GMT showing an explosive growth of the 
west end of the cumulus line A-B. 
Figure s. IR picture at 1803 GMT. The west and east ends were sepa-
rated into clouds A and B. 
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Figure 6. IR picture at 1833 GMT . Cloud B was moving eastward just 
to the north of JFK . Cloud A started forming an anv il cloud. 
Figure 7. IR picture at 1903 GMT. An anvil is spreading east-north-
eastward from cloud A. Cloud B is passing just to the north of JFK. 
Figure 8. IR picture at 1933 GMT. The first appearance of a dark 
grey area inside cloud A. The area is characterized by - 44°C or 
colder temperature: correctly, equivalent blackbody temperature . 
At 2003 GMT, cloud A and B had joined into a huge thunderstorm complex. 
Meanwhile, the organization of a long squall line was taking place far to the west of 
JFK. In many cases, an isolated thunderstorm ahead of a squall line is characterized 
by severe weather (Figure 9). 
A sequence of three pictures taken at 2033 GMT (Figure 10), 2103 GMT 
(Figure 11), and 2133 GMT (Figure 12) reveals that the areas of overall cloud as 
well as the areas of cold cloud tops kept increasing. 
Figure 9. IR picture at 2003 GMT, two minutes before the aircraft 
accident at JFK. An inverted T denotes the projection of an imagi-
nary, 45,000-ft tower at JFK. 
Figure 10. At 2033 GMT, the JFK Thunderstorm became an isolated storm 
situated ahead of an active squall line. 
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Figure 11. IR picture at 2103 GMT when the growth rate of the JFK 
Thunderstorm was decreasing. 
Figure 12. IR picture at 2133 GMT. The cloud area was 3200 sq. 
nautical miles, while the radar echo covered · an area as small as 
100 sq. nautical miles. The JFK Thunderstorm is decaying rapidly. 
It should be noted, however, that the rate of increase in the cloud area reached 
its maximum at about 2000 GMT (Figure 13). Likewise, the growth rate of the -44°C 
area hit the maximum at about the same time. Furthermore, the area of radar echo 
also reached the peak. Evidently the accident occurred when the JFK Thunderstorm 
was in its most active stage. 
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Figure 1 3 . Variation of the cloud imagery and radar-echo areas during 
a 6-hour period on June 24, 1975 . The rates o f i n c rease in the cloud 
and -44°C isot herm areas reached their maxima at about 200 5 GMT. At 
the same time, the r adar-echo area hit its peak , suggesting that the 
accident occurred during the height of the JFK Thunderstorm. 
3. MESOSCALE WEA 1HER SITUATION 
Satellite pictures taken during the early afternoon showed that there were 
scattered shower activities in Pennsylvania. A 300-mile wide band of smog extended 
toward the east-northeast from Virginia into the .A.tlantic. Four- to fiv·e-mile visibility 
was reported from JFK , La Guardia (LGA), and Newark (EWR) Airports . 
Since the nationwide weather maps are inadequate in examining local storm 
activities , mesoscale analyses within a 100-mile range from JFK were undertaken. 
The mesoscale in meteorology is defined as being the scale of motion within 10 to 100 
miles in horizontal dimensions. The gross features of most thunderstorms will fall 
into this scale. 
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The three major airports serving New York City and vicinity are JFK, LGA, 
and EWR. JFK is located on the northeast edge of Jamaica Bay, about 2 miles inland 
from Rockaway !Reach on the Atlantic coast of Long Island (Figure l~). 
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Figure 14. A key map showing the area of the mesoscale weather analyses. 
The mesoscale analysis map for 1753 GMT reveals a very complicated thermal 
structure of a weak front extending from central Pennsylvania to !Thoele Island. It is 
a definite cold front in Pennsylvania and in New Jersey, where it is very hot to the 
south of the front. The temperature contrast was enhanced by the showers just to 
the north of the front (Figure 15). 
From southern Coilllecticut to Rhode Island, the temperature gradient was 
apparently the opposite. It was 90° to 93°F to the north of the front, while the sea 
breeze temperature to the south was in the 70's or 80's. A line of sea breeze cumuli 
was seen in southern Coilllecticut and Rhode Island. 
Figure 15. The mesoscale wea ther situation at 1753 GMT. The numbers 
by t he s t a tions i nd icate t he a i r temperatu r e s i n Fahrenhe it. Winds 
a re p l otte d by doub ling the b arb s. One f ull b a r b denotes 5-kt wi nd. 
Due to solar heating, the Long Island sea breeze was blowing inland across 
the Atlantic beaches . Apparently there was a weak sea breeze from Long Island 
Sound, giving ris e to the formation of sea-breeze cumuli along the island's north 
coast. An early stage of the JFK Thunderstorm can be seen in northwestern New 
Jers ey on the cold front. The s torm was moving toward the east-southeas t at 1'6 kts. 
At 1851 GMT it was located on the cold front in north-central New Jers ey. 
Although the main storm, A, was still on the front, the forerwmer, B, moved 
away from the front and split into two cells--one located over lower Manhattan and 
the other northeast of LGA (Figure 16). For location of LGA, refer to Figure 14. 
Dramatic changes .in the echo pattern took place during the one-hour period 
between 19 and 20 GMT. The JFK Thunderstorm moved very rapidly toward the 
western tip of Long Island. A line of arc cloud developed along the leading edge of 
10 
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Figure 16. The mesoscale weather situation at 1851 GMT. One full barb 
denotes 5-kt wind. 
Figure 17. The mesoscale weather situation at 2002 GMT. Aircraft 
accident occurred at 2005 GMT and the airport was closed. One full 
barb denotes 5-kt wind. 
the over all outflow, the south edge of which was held back by the cold sea breeze from 
the Atlantic. In fact , the s ea-breeze temperature was cooler than that of the thWlder-
s torm outflow. JFK , in the s ea breeze , reported a temperature of 77°F while LGA, 
in the outflow , reported 86°F (Figure 17). 
The squall line activity in western Pennsylvania and northern New Jersey was 
intensifying rapidly. As a result , a surge of northwesterly winds became apparent in 
advance of a line of echoes. 
The mesoscale analysis map at 2053 GMT, about 5 PM , EDT, reveals that the 
JFK Thunderstorm was weakening and that it was accompanied by a radial outflow of 
cold air. JFK, located deep inside the outflow, reported a 76°F surface temperature 
(Figure 18 ). 
An intense squall line was advancing toward central New Jersey where surface 
temperature was in excess of 90°F. 
Figure 18. The mesosca le weath er s i tuat ion at 2053 GMT . Runway 1 3R- 31L 
op e n for land i ng a t 2053 GMT. One full barb d eno tes 5-kt wind. 
12 
13 
COOL 
\ 
20 60 NM 
...__......____._~...._......__.____, 
Figure 19. The mesoscal e weather situation at 2159 GMT when runway 
13L-31R at JFK resumed operations. One barb denotes 5-kt wind. 
By 2159 GMT, about 6 PM, EDT, the squall line reached central New Jersey. 
There was a distinct wind-shift line along its leading edge. In spite of the appearance 
of strong echoes on the radar, the maximum wind behind the wind-shift line was only 
26 kts. This maximum was recorded at LGA at 2207 GMT (Figure 19). 
The JFK Thunderstorm was monitored by radar at three stations. 
1. WSR-57 radar of the National Weather Service Forecast Office at Rockefeller 
Center, New York City, N. Y. (NYC) 
2. AN/FPS-77 radar of McGuire Air Force Base, N. J. (MCG) 
3. WSR-57 radar at Atlantic City, N. J. (ACY) 
A total of seven measurements of the echo top.s of the JFK Thunderstorm 
were made by these three stations. The results are as follows : 
Time Direct -Dist Max Top 
1830GMT 285 - 40 nm 37,000 ft 
1907 008 - 85 48,000 
1932 011 - 86 53,000 
1933 278 - 19 35,000 
1936 018 - 45 44,000 
2032 030 - 85 49,000 
2036 045 - 53 40,000 
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Echo Motion 
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Figure 20 . Height of the echo t ops of the JFK Thunderstorm measured by 
three radars: Atlantic City, McGuire Air Force Base,. and Rockefeller 
Center, New York City. 
The vanation of the echo-top height turned out to be between 35,000 and 
49 ,000 ft. The NYC radar was checked under the direction of Gibson (1975), who 
found everything to be within the required tolerance. 
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When these echo-top measurements are plotted on one map, one can see that 
there are apparent differences in the measured height (Figure 20). 
a. McGuire AFB radar has a tendency to under-estimate the range by 10 to 15%. 
Range correction would increase the 44, 000 to 50, 000 ft and the 40, 000 to 
44,000 ft. 
b. The further the cloud distance from the radar, the higher the echo top. 
This trend is most significant at about 1935 GMT when all three stations 
measured the tops within the JFK Thunderstorm area. 
c. It is unlikely that the top of an identical echo was measured simultaneously. 
There is no way of selecting the identical echo top to be measured by the 
three radars. 
d. Echo-top height varies rapidly with time. It would be impractical to measure 
the time and space variations of echo tops by the use of current weather 
radars. 
The satellite pictures, . as well as the observations by airline pilots , revealed 
the existence of an anvil cloud atop the JFK Thunderstorm. The heights of the anvil 
measured from the shadows were 41, 000 and 43, 000 ft (see Figure 2). The tropopause 
was located at about 46,000 ft. Since the tropopause above New York City on June 24 , 
1975 was not well defined, the spreading of an anvil cloud may have occurred at any 
height above 40, 000 ft where a relatively stable layer existed. 
Taking the above evidence and the inevitability of error into consideration, 
we may assume that the JFK Thunderstorm was topped by anvil clouds at the 40,000 
to 43,000-ft level. Since the equivalent blackbody temperature of the anvil was colder 
than -44°C (air temperature at 36, 000 ft) but warmer than -58°C (air temperature at 
41, 000 ft), its emissivity must have been less than 1. 00. The thunderstorm was 
probably topped by a relatively thin anvil cloud. 
The detailed mesoscale weather analyses presented in this section provide a 
better understanding of the local weather on June 24, 1975. Still, we will have to know 
why the JFK Thunderstorm was more dangerous than numerous other storms . 
4. SPEARHEAD ECHO 
Shortly after the aircraft accident , there was speculation that the JFK Thunder-
storm had a hook echo in it. A hook echo is known to be extremely dangerous to 
aviation because it could spawn tornadoes, and all pilots are aware that they should 
stay clear of hook-echo thunderstorms. 
16 
A subsequent examination of radar film from Atlantic City, N. J. by Gibson 
(1975) disproved the existence of a hook echo. On a visit to the National Weather 
Service Forecast Office, New York City, in November, 1975, this matter was discussed 
with him in depth. Neither of us found evidence of a hook echo. 
Gibson emphasized a very important characteristic of the JFK Thunderstorm. 
As he stated in his report, echo A moved to the east-southeast at a speed of 30 to 
35 kts, while the forerunner echoes were moving in the same direction at 20 to 25 kts. 
The greater speed of echo A resulted in an overtaking and subsequent merger of echoes. 
All of this was taking place in the immediate vicinity of JFK at the approximate time 
of the aircraft accident. 
In order to generalize Gibson's findings, the author made a ti.me-sequence 
analysis of the JFK Thunderstorm (Figure 21). 
It is evident that two forerunner echoes existed to the north and northwest of 
JFK at 1905 and moved slowly toward the east-southeast. The echo which was moving 
behind the JFK Thunderstorm also traveled slowly. Tue motion of these echoes was 
only 15 to 17 kts. The JFK Thunderstorm, which had been moving rather slowly until 
1916 GMT, suddenly accelerated toward JFK. We shall try to determine the reason 
for this fast movement of the echo. 
Within the 11 minutes between 1905and1916 GMT, an appendage formed near 
the east end of the major echo. The first appendage, seen in the 1910. 7 GMT picture , 
was three miles long with a sharp point. The point , somewhat like a spearhead, 
extended very rapidly. By 1940 GMT, the spearhead appendage became so large that 
the parent echo began losing its identity. Within a few minutes, the parent echo was 
drawn quickly into the appendage. 
The 1951 GMT radar picture shows that the parent echo was drawn entirely 
into the appendage, which was moving rapidly toward JFK Airport. The appendage 
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Figure 21. Formation and ad-
v ance of a spearhead echo. 
This time sequence shows how 
a small appendage grew into 
a spearhead e cho, r esulting 
in the decay of the parent 
echo. 
had now lost its identity, redeveloping into a fast-moving "spearhead echo". The 
spearhead echo merged with a small echo located to the north of JFK Airport at 
1951 GMT. 
The spearhead echo at 2002 GMT was about 15 miles long and 5 miles wide 
and located just north of the airport. The radar picture was taken with a 0. 2 elevation 
angle when the JFK Thtm.derstonn was 80 miles away froin the Atlantic City radar. 
The height of the radar beam above JFK was computed to be about 7 , 000 ft. Due to the 
beam width, the image of a point target elongates in the direction perpendicular to 
the beam. The elongation for a one-degree beam width is 1. 3 miles at an 80-mile 
distance. We must therefore evaluate the radar i.mages of the JFK Thtmderstonn, 
taking these values into consideration. 
In view of the suspected relationship between the aircraft accident under investi-
gation and the spearhead echo, we shall define the latter as follows : 
SPEARHEAD ECHO: A radar echo with a pointed appendage extending toward 
the direction of the echo motion. The appendage moves much faster than the parent 
Figure 22. Another spearhead 
echo of June 24, 1975, which 
developed to the north of 
Allentown Airport, Pa . 
echo which is being drawn in to the appendage. During the mature stage, the appendage 
turns into a major echo and the parent echo loses its identity. Ground-based weather 
radar will be able to detect a spearhead echo 100 miles away. It is not known at this 
time whether airborne radar will be able to detect such a spearhead echo. 
In an attempt to determine the frequency of spearhead echoes on June 24, 1975, 
the Atlantic City radar film was examined in detail, leading to the finding of another 
spearhead echo. The second one formed just to the north of Allentown in eastern 
Pennsylvania. At 2015 GMT the echo was about 80 miles from the Atlantic City radar 
(Figure 22). 
The life of a spearhead echo appears to be relatively short. The appendage of 
the JFK echo started forming at 1910 GMT, reaching its mature stage in about 50 
minutes. The Allentown echo repeated a similar cycle between 2015 and 2111 GMT, 
taking about one hour (Figure 23). 
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Figure 23. Isochrone of the boundaries of two spearhead echoes, showing 
their development within approximately one hour. 
It. was ~ortunate that Allentown Airfield was not affected by the spearhead echo. 
On the other hand, an earlier spearhead echo rushed toward the approach end of one 
of the JFK runways, 22-L. Within 25 minutes, between 1944 and 2009 GMT, 14 air-
craft, including three 747s and two L-lOlls, either landed or attempted to land at 
JFK. 
To evaluate the probability of occurrence of spearhead echoes on June 24, 
... 1975, the Atlantic City radar was re-evaluated. The hourly counts of echoes over the 
Atlantic States are summarized in the following table: 
Time Number of Ordinary Echoes Spearhead Echoes 
1652GMT 1 0 
1753 3 0 
1850 13 0 
1950 14 1 
2052 18 1 
2152 19 0 
2247 24 0 
2354 15 0 
Total 107 2 
This table shows that only 2 out of 109 echoes are classified as spearhead 
echoes . . All others were, more or less, summer- time echoes which may not present 
serious problems in aviation. 
Gibson's (1975) statement is very important in this regard. His record shows 
that the only report of a wind gust equal to or in excess of 35 kts came from the 
Morristown , N. i. Municfpal Airport, which reported 55 kts occurring at 1915 GMT. 
Although he does not preclude the possibility of an unreported occurrence , his record 
was the only report received ·for June 24, 1975 from northern New Jersey , New York 
City and. Long Island. The Morristown Airport is located 32 miles to the west-north-
west of JFK. A spearhead echo was forming just to the north of the airport when the 
55-kt wind was reported (Figure 23). 
The probability that an airport will be under the influence of a spearhead echo 
is very low, say less than two percent of the th~derstorm probability. Furthermore , 
the location of aviation hazards is limited to only ·a fraction of the spearhead-echo 
area. This subject will be discussed i,n the following chapter. 
5. TJME-SPACE ANALYSIS OF APPROACH AREA 
During ~e critical period of 22 minutes, prior to the accident at 2005. 2 GMT, 
' . . . 
12 aircraft made approaches along the localizer-course ~{ the instrument landing 
system (ILS) of runway 22-L at JFK. However, not all aircraft encountered difficulties 
serious enough that the pilots reported it to the tower. 
The chronological events experienced by the landing aircraft are tabula.ted. 
Aircraft Type Landing Time Approach and Landing Conditions 
A 747 * 1944 GMT Some wind shear; insignificant to report to tower 
B 707 * 1946 Add power from 500 ft down; normal touchdown. 
c DC-9 * 1948 Experienced a downdraft before the touchdown in rain. 
D 707 1949 Approach and landing were normal. 
E 747 1951 Experienced little rain on touchdown. 
F 747 * 1952 Some wind shear, not necessary to report to tower. 
G 707 * 1954 At 200 ft , 8~drift to the left. 
H DC-8 ** 1956 Strong, sustained sink followed by strong crosswind. 
I L-1011 ** 1958 Plane sank while drifting right; abandoned approach. 
J DC-8 1959 Landed normally without difficulties. 
K BEECH * 2002 Applied power to recover from sink; landing normal. 
L 727 ** 2005 Caught in intense downburst at 400 ft. Accident. 
M 727 2007 Abandoned approach due to accident. 
N L-1011 2009 Abandoned approach due to accident. 
**experienced major difficulty *insignificant difficulty 
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It is important, first of all, to recognize that the landing difficulties occurred 
during three distinct periods separated by those of normal landings. The three 
periods were 1945to1949, 1952 to 1959, and 2002 to 2005+. If we assume the traveling 
motion of the spearhead echo to be 30 kts, the horiz-ontal dimension of the hazardous 
areas would be only 3 to 5 miles. A pilot could complete a normal approach and 
landing during the calm period without being able to see or being aware of the danger 
areas on either side of his approach path. 
From a meteorological point of view, it is impractical to reconstruct the 
three-dimensional wind field based on the information of surface winds in the approach 
area. First of all, there is no wind information except eyewitness accounts. Secondly, 
we cannot expect to determine the time within an accuracy of one minute or less. It 
is a very difficult problem to analyze the airflow of small scale disturbances. 
To overcome analytical difficulties , the concept of TIME-SPACE COORDINATES 
was developed. For the original work, refer to Fujita (1963). The coordinates 
consist of the paths of the aircraft shifted successively in a direction opposite to 
that of the movement of the spearhead echo. In constructing the time-space coordinates 
for this investigation, the approach path of runway 22- L at JFK was shifted toward 
292°true (304°magnetic) at 30 kts (Figure 24). 
The coordinates were designed to include the touchdown time between 1943 and 
2010 GMT. The map of the JFK area corresponding to the localizer approach of the 
accident aircraft was placed in the coordinates. The black circles with the time in 
GMT denote the one-minute positions of the landing aircraft. The take-off positions 
of the departing aircraft are shown by open circles. 
The heights along the glideslope plane are shown at 100 ft intervals. Actual 
heights are indicated for those aircraft for which the radar and/ or altimeter altitudes 
were available. As a measure of the crosswind component, the aircraft headings at 
10-second intervals were plotted after subtracting the magnetic heading of runway 22-L. 
Since the overall crooswind component was from the right of the path, most aircraft 
kept correcting a 1° to 8° drift during the localizer approaches. 
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Figure 24. Time-space coordinates of the 22-L approach path relative 
to the moving weather systems . The glideslope , the outer marker 
(LOM) and middle marker (MM), and runways were shifted toward 292° 
true at 30 kts. Aircraft headings at 10-sec in terval s were plotted 
after subtracting t he magnetic heading of the runway. The directions 
of small arrows are exaggerated 5 times. 
The airflow patterns near the approach end of 22-L can be depicted by plotting 
the events experienced by each aircraft. These events are summarized as follows: 
Aircraft "A" (747): encountered moderate rain at about the outer marker. 
There was no turbulence. Broke out into light rain at 1, 000 ft. Encountered some 
wind shear on final approach. It required considerable extra power to maintain 
approach speed, but the pilot did not consider the wind shear to be significant enough 
to mention to the tower. (From Exhibit 2-V of the National Transportation Safety 
Board's (NTSB) Exhibits introduced during a public hearing.) 
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Aircraft "B" (707): experienced smooth air all the way down to the final 
approach. The only indication of wind shear or a downdraft was after passing 500 ft. 
From that point on, the pilot added power to maintain the ILS glideslope and to keep 
the speed from eroding. Sighted a thunderstorm about a mile to the right of the 
approach path, just short of runway 22-L at JFK. The rain from the storm was 
falling on the approach end of the runway. The flight engineer asswned that there 
was an increased headwind associated with the thunderstorm. · (From Exhibit 2-V.) 
Aircraft "C" (DC-9): experienced a downdraft at about one mile from the 
end of runway 22- L. Landed in light rain. (From Exhibit 2-V. ) 
Aircraft 'D" (707): between the outer and middle markers moderate rain 
was encountered. The approach and landing were normal. The landing roll-out was 
made on dry rllllway. (From Exhibit 2-V. ) 
Aircraft "E" (747): experienced heavy rain at 1,000 ft. There was some 
wind shear during the early part of the approach. There was little rain on touchdown. 
(From Exhibit 2-A~) 
Aircraft "F" (747): 10 kts headwind and 2°left drift at the outer marker. 
Entered the rain at about 1, 200 ft. Light rain changed into heavy rain. The airborne 
Inertial Navigation System (INS) indicated a headwind of 15 kts with 4°left drift. Air-
speed dropped at 300 ft, requiring power. INS headwind 10 kts with 1°left drift at 
100 ft. Rain stopped when over the runway threshold. Landed with 2°left drift. First 
half of runway was wet and the other half was dry. (From Exhibit 2-V.) 
Aircraft "G" (707): encountered extremely heavy rain at about soo· ft. At 
about 200 ft, drift was 8° left or 18 kts crosswind from right to left of the aircraft. 
Windshield wipers were operated at high speed in extremely heavy rain. No drift 
correction required at touchdown in heavy rain. Rolled for about 1, 000 ft and 
broke out on dry runway in sunlight. While on the taxiway, the pilot saw that the 
next aircraft, "H", was in difficult maneuver. "Thought that the pilot must have 
been like a cat on a hot tin roof, trying to save his airplane." (From Exhibit 2-V.) 
Aircraft ''H" (DC-8): encountered strong, sustained downdraft from about 
700 ft down to about 200 ft. The pilot used an abnormal amount of power for an 
unusually Ieng period of time. From 200 ft to touchdown the downdraft was moderate 
but the crosswind from the right was very strong. It was blowing about 50 or 55 kts 
just off the ground, and then all of a sudden there was practically no wind on the 
ground. The pilot had to use 10°to 15°heading to the right during the ILS approach 
then it changed to 7°to the left. No drift correction was required at touchdown. 
(From Exhibits 2-V, 12-B, and Flight Recorder.) 
, 
Aircraft "!" (L-1011): everything was normal to about 400 ft. The air was 
smooth and it was not raining. As the aircraft flew into extremely heavy rain, 
visibility dropped to zero, and the aircraft started to sink and drift to the right. Then 
the airspeed dropped from 144 kts to 121 kts. Applied power to pull up, and the 
missed approach was initiated. The aircraft kept descending to 60 ft above the ground 
before the pilot was able to stop the descent by using considerable power while pulling 
the nose up to an abnormally high angle. (From Exhibits 2-V and Flight Recorder. ) 
Aircraft "J" (DC-8): rain was heaviest between 6 to 3 miles final. The INS 
wind reading at 1, 500 ft was 230° at 30 kts with 2° left drift. At about 2 miles final, 
the aircraft lost 25 kts indicated airspeed. The subsequent approach and landing 
were normal. (From Exhibit 2-V.) 
Aircraft "K" (Beech): encountered light turbulence and moderate to heavy 
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rain from just outside the outer marker down halfway to middle marker. · The approach 
continued normally 'lllltil about 2 or 300 ft, where a heavy sink rate was experienced. 
The airspeed dropped about 20 kts. Applied power to recover from the sink; remainder 
of the approach was normal. (From Exhibit 2-V.) 
Aircraft "L" (727): flew into rain at 700 ft. Rain became heavy at about 500 ft. 
The aircraft began sinking at 400 ft and airspeed dropped from 138 kts down to 122 kts 
in 7 seconds. The runway was in sight at 140 ft. The aircraft hit the approach lights 
at 2005+12 sec GMT about 2, 400 ft short of the runway threshold. (From Flight 
Recorder and Exhibit 12-A.) 
Aircraft "M" (727): following the previous aircraft on ILS approach. Instructed 
to go around at 2005+30 sec GMT. (From Exhibit 2-V and 3- C.) 
The events experienced by Aircraft "A" through '~M" were plotted on the 
time-space coordinates in an attempt to depict the meteorological conditions which 
had existed along the ILS approach path (Figure 25). The result revealed the existence 
of three major areas of localized outflow. There must have been a concentrated 
downward motion above each of these outflow areas. Without a massive supply of 
descending air, the intense outflow could not have originated nor been maintained. 
The initial concept of a downdraft in a thunderstorm was introduced by Byers 
and Braham (1949) in their publication , "The Thunderstorm". The downdraft is a 
sustained, non-horizontal current of air descending in a thunderstorm. This current 
was identified as a downdraft provided the downward speed exceeded 3 fps. Jn order 
to distinguish an extremely intense downdraft from an ordinary one, Byers and Fujita 
(1975) introduced a new term, 'DOWNBURST". A "downburst" is a localized, intense 
downdraft with vertical currents exceeding a downward speed of 12 fps or 720 feet per 
minute (fpm) at 300 ft above the surface. This value corresponds to a divergence of 
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The paths of the approaching and departing aircraft .drawn on 
time-space coordinates relative to the moving downburst cells near 
the threshold of runway 22-L at JFK Airport. Because of the sea-
breeze front, the outburst air from these cells were held back to 
the north of the runway area (Top Figure of this page). 
Shown on the opposite page are the paths of . aircraft 11 I 11 and 
11 L11 in the vertical planes. The captain of Aircraft "I" executed 
the missed approach and applied ,power to approximately take-off 
range. The aircraft started recovering altitude at about 60 ft 
above the ground (Upper Figure). 
Aircraft "L" was pushed down to the ground by an extraordinarily 
strong downburst (Lower Figure) . 
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The vertical rate of descent of an aircraft on a 3° glides lope in still air can be 
. 0 
computed by V x sin 3 • Representative rates computed by this equation are: 
Airspeed Rate of descent 
60 kts s. 3 fps 318 fpm 
90 8.0 478 
120 10.6 637 
150 13~3 797 
180 15~ ·9 956 
The velocities of the outflowing air from a downdraft or a down.burst decrease 
with the di.stance from the cell~ Therefore, if an aircraft was approaching a down-
burst cell (DBC), there might be no identifying drift, unusual rate of descent, or 
abnormal power requirement to alert the pilot, until after the effects of the down.burst 
cell were encountered. Since an aircraft may fly into a downburst abruptly and 
unexpectedly, immediate recognition and quick action by the pilot would be necessary 
to overcome its effects. If the aircraft's position along the approach path did not 
provide sufficient time for pilot recognition and action, and aircraft response, the 
flight might not be able to execute a missed approach before contacting the ground. 
Three downburst cells (DB Cs) near the approach end of runway 22- L were 
identified as DB C 1, DB C 2, and DB C 3. Their widths were less than 3 miles 
and they were separated by relatively calm spaces between them (Figure 25). 
Apparently the outflow from downburst areas did not move out into the runway 
area of JFK. None of the five aircraft, "P" through "T", encountered problems 
during their take-off from runway 22-R. The wind tower, located about one and a 
quarter mile southwest of the approach end of 22-L, was not affected by the outflow 
wind. The sea-breeze front lay between the wind tower and the approach path to 
runway 22- L. 
The ground- level wind near the north boundary of the airport was entirely 
different from the reported winds. The captain of Aircraft "S", while taxiing on 
runway 31-L, observed small trees bending over from an estimated 20- to 30-mph 
wind blowing almost parallel to runway 13- 31. Then he looked toward the approach 
end of 22-L to find Aircraft "H" getting in a nose-up attitude with its left wing down. 
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Figure 2 5 . Three downburs t cells (DBCs) depicted on time-space coordi-
nates. DBC l was on the runway threshold and DBC 2 affected seriously 
the approach effort of aircraft "H" and "I". DBC 3 blew aircraft 11 L" 
down to the ground, 2 , 000 ft s hort of runway 22-L. Most of the air-
port was under the influence o f sea breeze. The outflow from down-
burst cells was distorted by the sea breeze front, resulting in the 
strong outflow winds to the north of the front. 
However, the pilot was able to bring the aircraft to a more normal position before 
landing on 22-L. 
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The crosswind shear experienced by Aircraft "H'' was spectacular. The 
228°heading at 1955 + 58 sec was c.hanged to 237°at 1956+04 sec. It is likely that the 
pilot responded to the sudden increase of crosswind from the right. The INS 
determined drift was 25°to 30°when IAS was 150 kts. A 60- to 70-kt crosswind would 
be required to produce such an extreme drift. 
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6. FLIGHT PATHS IN RELATION TO RADAR ECHOES 
Excellent scope pictures at the WSR-57 radar of the National Weather Service 
at Atlantic City were taken every 5 to 6 minutes. The times of pictures taken shortly 
before the aircraft accident are 
1945. 7, 1951.4, 1956.7, and 2002.4 GMT. 
Echoes in these pictures were contoured by their intensity. According to Gibson's 
( 1975) interpretation, the three-level contours represent the theoretical rainfall rates, 
0.1, O. 5, and 1. O inch per hour. As estimated in Section 4, the height of the radar 
beam above the JFK area was about 7, 000· ft. These rainfall rates, therefore, could 
be significantly different from those on the ground or along the ILS glideslope. 
The three-level iso-echo contours at 1945. 7 GMT were placed on a local map 
covering the JFK Airport and vicinity. The accident Aircraft "L" en route from New 
Orleans was in a holding pattern to the east of Asbury Park, N. J. 
At this time, the spearhead echo which caused the 55-kt wind at the Morristown, 
N. J. Airport at 1915 GMT had already reached the JFK area. A weak downburst cell, 
DBC 1, was passing over the approach end of 22-L. Aircraft "P" took off from 22-R 
in heavy rain with windshield wipers on full speed. The rain ended when the aircraft 
was leaving the runway. Aircraft "B" and "C" were affected by the downburst DBC 1. 
DBC 2 was moving toward JFK followed by DBC 3, which had crossed the East 
River over to northern Brooklyn. Apparently all three DBCs missed the four wind 
recorders in the New York City area. The peak wind speeds were recorded as follows: 
Wind Recorder Height above G:tnd. Time Peak Wind Closest DBC 
LGA 20 ft 2011 GMT 18 kts DBC 4 or 5 
Central Park 132 1952 24 DBC4 
EWR 15 1937 32 DBC 3 or 4 
JFK 20 1950 10 DBC 1 
same same 1956 17 DBC 2 
same same 2005 10 DBC 3 
same same 2020 14 DBC 4 
Wind warnings for aviation interests are issued if winds are expected to equal 
or exceed 35 kts. None of these peak winds was fast enough to initiate a warning. An 
irony of fate had permitted all of the four , or possibly five , DBCs to sneak through 
between the wind recorders. Had they approached from due west, the first one 
certainly would have been caught by EWR. An approach from the northwest would have 
provided a definite chance of detection by both Central Park and LGA. 
The meteorological tower operated by the Long Island Lighting Company 
(LILCO) depicted the passage of the downburst cells. The instrumented tower, with 
an anemometer at a 205 ft level is located at Oceanside about 7 miles east-southeast 
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of the accident site (Figure 26). The recorded winds plotted on a time-space diagram 
reveal the flow patterns of the weakening DBCs. The LILCO tower had been recording 
a 20-mph sea breeze prior to the onset of the downburst (Figure 27). 
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Figure 26 . Radar echoes at 1945.7 GMT and the aircraft paths converted 
into time-space domain • 
. At 1951. 4 GMT, the spearhead echo extended from lower Manhattan to the 
north of JFK. Aircraft ''D" through "G" landed without incident. Accident. Aircraft 
"L" headed toward the south coast of Long Island (Figure 28). 
A helicopter en route from LGA to EWR encmmtered the.fourth downburst 
cell, DBC 4. A thunderstorm with heavy rain was moving over the south half of 
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Manhattan and the upper New York Bay area. The helicopter flying at 1, 200 ft passed 
just to the south of the Empire State Building, 14 72-ft high including the TV antenna 
mast. At 1950 GMT, over the Hudson River, it flew into extremely heavy rain with 
drastically reduced visibility. On the west side of the river, the helicopter dropped 
to 600 ft while holding 863 torque, which is the maximum continuous power. The 
drop was due to the vertical current, which, while neither sharp nor sudden, was 
nevertheless very strong, requiring full continuous power just to maintain height 
after losing 600 ft. In the matter of a minute or so, it was in the clear and flew to 
Newark. 
Before reaching the coast, Aircraft "L" descended from 7, 000 to 4, 000 ft. 
It then flew around a rain cell, crossing the shore line at 1955. 6 GMT. At 1956. 7 
GMT, the radar time, Aircraft "L" was just to the northeast of the rain cell. Air-
craft "H" landed after suffering from a severe crosswind shear and Aircraft "I" 
was approaching DBC 2 (Figure 29). 
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Figure 29. Radar echo es at 1956.7 GMT and aircraft paths converted 
into time-space domain. 
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At 2002. 4 GMT, the next radar time, Aircraft "L" was approaching the 
outer marker with the landing gear down. A few minutes later, at 2006 , Aircraft ''N" 
observed on airborne radar a circular cell about 3 miles in diameter located over 
the threshold of runway 22- L. Aircraft "L" had hit the ground short of the runway 
(Figure 30). 
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Figure 30. Radar echoes at 2002.4 GMT, just about 3 minutes before the 
accident. 
7. EFFECTS OF DOWNBURST AND WIND SHEAR 
Aircraft "I" (L-1011) initiated the missed approach after experiencing a 
heavy sink and right drift. The plane was obviously under the influence of a strong 
descending current and a crosswind from the left. The loss of indicated airspeed 
suggests a significant decrease in the headwind component. 
In an attempt to reconstruct the pattern of airflow in the vertical plane, 
solutions of environmental winds in Exhibit 13-C and its supplement were examined. 
When the flow fields were delineated from these two solutions, the one in EXh.ibit 13-C 
appeared to be far more realistic from a meteorological point of view. 
The headwind component in Exhibit 13-C shows that Aircraft "I" was 
experiencing about 15 fps (9 kts) headwind when it flew into heavy rain at about 400 ft. 
At 250 ft, the headwind changed into tailwind. Downward current then intensified 
reaching 21 fps at 210 ft (Figure 31). 
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Figure 31. The wind profiles of Aircraft "I" from Exhibit 13-C. Winds 
are plotted as the function of height above runway. 
"The Thunderstorm" (1949) revealed the frequency distribution of downdraft 
speeds measured at various altitudes during the 1946 and '47 seasons of Project 
operation in Florida and Ohio, respectively. According to the statistics, the mean 
downdraft values increase from theoretical "zero" at the surface to about 10 fps at 
the 4, 000 ft level. The high values are approximately three times larger than the 
mean values at various altitudes (Figure 32). It is evident that the vertical speed of 
the downburst, 12 fps or larger at 300 ft above the ground, is about ten times larger 
than the mean downdraft speed estimated from "The Thunderstorm". 
The effect of the downburst upcn the maneuver of Aircraft "I" can be 
effectively shown on the height-distance diagram, which includes the flight path and 
the two-dimensional winds (Figure 33). The L-1011 (aircraft "I") was descending 
above the ILS glides lope until approximately 400 ft at which time it flew into heavy 
rain, with zero visibility. As the descent continued, the aircraft sank below the 
glideslope and was pushed to the right of the extended centerline of the runway. The 
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Figure 32. Frequencies of down-
draft speeds measured by the 
Thunderstorm Project, 1946 and 
'47. Frequencies were plotted 
from Table 10 of the Thunder-
storm (1949). 
sinking motion and the right drift occurred simultaneously. The missed approach 
was executed and power was applied to approximately take-off range. The pilot was 
able to keep the wings level while involved with the low airspeed and high rate of 
descent. The aircraft continued sinking lllltil it started recovering altitude at about 
60 ft above the ground. 
When the aircraft broke out into the clear, it was about halfway down the 
approach lights and to the right of the extended centerline of the runway. It continued 
on the missed approach procedures toward the runway heading. A few minutes later, 
the JFK Airport was closed due to the accident of Aircraft "L "; and the L-1011 diverted 
to EWR and landed without encountering any additional significant weather. 
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Figure 33. The path of Aircraft "I" through downburst cell No . 2 . 
In general, the air near the ground spreads out violently from the "outburst 
center", the spreading center above the grolllld. Unless a heading correction is 
made immediately, an aircraft in the crosswind burst will drift away from its expected 
cours.e. If an aircraft flies straight into the outburst center, its indicated airspeed 
will increase momentarily followed by a high rate of sink. Before the aircraft can 
break out of the downburst cell , its indicated airspeed will drop suddenly, due to an 
increase in the tailwind component (Figure 34). The strong wind shear encountered 
by Aircraft "I" was the result of a downburst which produced vertical and horizontal 
shear. Any aircraft encountering such a downburst would lose altitude and/ or drift 
to either the left or the right, depending on its position in relation to the center of the 
downburst. 
"Wind Shear" is a very important phenomenon which could affect the aircraft 
during a final approach in various ways. Tills term , however , is used differently 
in aviation and in meteorology. 
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Figure 34 . Effects of downburst and outburst upon aircraft during a 
final · approach. Of these the most dangerous one is the downburst, 
crosswind burst, and tailwind burst encountered near the ground . 
Outburst is defined as being the strong outflow created when a down-
burst hits the ground and spreads out. 
The meteorological definition of 'Wind shear" is the local variation of the 
wind vector or its components in a given direction and distance. The direction can 
be either horizontal or vertical, so that we may define 
a. vertical variation of horizontal winds 
b. horizontal variation of vertical winds. 
These values can be expressed by the variation per distance, such as kt/mile, 
kt/1000 ft , m/ sec per meter, etc. 
In aviation the effect of the wind shear is felt as the time variation of winds 
rather than the spatial variation. Furthermore, the direction is taken along the 
flight path. An aircraft may experience difficulty when it encounters a sudden 
change in the wind, both in direction and speed. The vectorial difference of the 
wind between two points on the flight path is the vector shear, since 
Vector Wind Shear - Wind B minus Wind A 
Flight time between A and B 
When the aircraft flies further, B to C, C to D , etc. , the vector wind shear will 
vary successively (Figure 35 ). 
Figure 35. Pictorial expression of vector shear, headwind shear, and 
crosswind shear likely to be encountered by an aircraft flying in 
or near a downburst cell. 
1\vo components of the vector wind shear are identified technically as 
"crosswind shear" and ''head- or tailwind shear". This analysis considers the 
effects on an aircraft during an ILS approach wherein the aircraft must remain 
within close limits to the on-course of both the localizer and the glideslope signals. 
Such precision would not be required at a higher altitude. 
Shear may affect an aircraft along any of its three axes. Shear causes 
action; pilots react; and the resulting corrections keep the aircraft on course. If 
the force of the shear exceeds the capability of the aircraft to maintain its desired 
path, it would experience excessive deviations. Wind shear may be severe enough 
to cause accelerations which a pilot can recognize as vestibular cues to a change in 
direction or velocity. 
Crosswind Shear - A sudden change in wind direction and/or speed, such 
as a "crosswind burst", may carry the aircraft sideways , momentarily. This may 
be recognized by the pilot as a skid or a slip. These sensations are not common 
when flying heavy aircraft, and would be an alert cue to expect displacement from 
the localizer. Continuing the approach would require a sufficient altitude to permit 
a heading correction. 
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Headwind or Tailwind Shear - A sudden change in the headwind or tailwind 
does not affect drift,and heading corrections are not required. Sin.ce acceleration 
and deceleration are common sensations in flying, these cues would not alert a 
pilot. He could recognize head or tailwind shear by sudden changes in indicated 
airspeed. 
Each aircraft has a speed associated to power vs. drag (speed stability). 
Rapid changes in the mass of air through which the aircraft is flying upset this 
relationship. Headwind shear would cause IAS to momentarily increase until the 
aircraft re-established its speed stability. It would be necessary for the pilot to 
lower the nose of the airplane and make a power reduction in order to remain on 
the glides lope. As the increased IAS dissipates, additional power would again be 
required as the ground speed would be decreasing and time-to-runway would increas e. 
Tailwind shear will cause IAS to decrease rapidly. Power must be increased 
simultaneously with the raising of the nose of the airplane in order to remain on the 
glides lope. 
Vertical Wind Shear - Although in aviation, the variation in the up- or 
downdraft along the flight path is often called the ''Vertical Wind Shear", this term 
in meteorology denotes the variation of horizontal wind along the vertical. Unless a 
spacecraft takes off or lands vertically, the vertical wind shear in the meteorological 
sense is not too important. In aviation, however, "Vertical Wind Shear" means 
the variation of vertical wind along the flight path. After an air craft flies through a 
strong downward current, which does not vary horizontally, it could still be blown 
down toward the ground. 
An aircraft flying into a vertical wind shear will momentarily accelerate in 
the vertical plane. This may be recognized by the pilot as a sinking sensation similar 
to an elevator descending. The pilot would have to bring the aircraft nose up and 
increas.e the power in order to maintain or regain the glideslope position. A strong 
or long-duration vertical wind shear would require an unusually high airplane body 
angle to create sufficient lift to maintain the glideslope position. A very high body 
angle would be necessary to s top the descent and to enable the airplane to execute 
a missed-approach. 
The four most important winds and their effects may be identified as: 
(I) CROSSWIND SHEAR - Aircraft drifts to the right or left. 
(II) TAILWIND SHEAR - Indicated airspeed drops suddenly and aircraft sinks. 
(III) HEADWIND SHEAR - Indicated airspeed increases suddenly and aircraft 
gains altitude. 
(IV) DOWNBURST - Aircraft sinks abruptly. 
Three wind profiles , A, B, and C of Aircraft .... "L" which were presented in 
Exhibit 13-D were examined. Of these , A had been computed by assuming that the 
approach power was a fuel flow of 4, 596 lb/engine, a constant until descending to 
140 ft. Thereafter, the power setting was 583 . In computing wind profile B, the 
engine thrust was varied between a few 3 to 4 73 in order to generate the actual sink 
rate under the assumption of no downdraft. Wind profile C was computed by assuming 
the horizontal wind profile B, and keeping the engine power constant at 4 , 596 lb/ engine 
of fuel flow. Then the downdraft was computed in order to generate the actual sink 
rate. 
From a meteorological point of view, wind profile A is more reasonable 
than B or C. Seen in profile A are the double maxima in downdraft speed at about 
600 and 200 ft. The one at 220 ft reached 21 fps (1260 fpm), which would induce a 
0. 95 sec-• or 340 hr-• divergence below the flight altitude (Figure 36). 
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Figure 36. The wind prof i les of Aircraft "L" from Exhibit 13-D. Winds 
are plotted as the function o f h e ight ab ove the JFK runway level. 
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Aircraft "L" descended slightly above the glideslope in smooth air from the 
outer marker to 730 ft MSL where light rain was encountered. As it approached 
500 ft, the windshield wipers were set at high speed, and the glideslope was inter-
cepted. Exhibit 13-D (Figure 36) indicates two strong headwind gusts of 25 and 
28 fps (15 and 17 kts) as it entered the downburst (Figure 37). The headwind decreased 
from 28 fps to 7 fps, while a 5 fps updraft changed to a 21 fps downburst. The loss 
of the headwind and the downburst which was encountered caused the aircraft to 
descend below the glideslope at 300 ft, near the core of the downburst. 
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Figure 37 . The path of Aircraft "L" through downburst cell No. 3 
(DBC 3). The spreading beneath the cell was extraordinarily strong. 
Until descending down to 130 ft the pilot of Aircraft "L" could not see the 
runway. He saw the JFK runway 22-L at 2005 +06 sec GMT. About 5 sec later 
the initial impact took place. It is very difficult to determine the crosswind compo-
nent during the final descent below 200 ft. The flight recorder data show that the 
heading changes were 
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200 150 100 50 0 
227° 226° 225° 227° 224° 
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40 
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The pattern of debris and the location of clipped approach lights suggests that , 
at the time of the impact, the aircraft was very slightly to the right of the approach 
center line, with the left wing down (Figure 38 ). 
The author's initial attempt was to determine the surface wind based on the 
debris patterns. However , the distribution of debris seems to have been affected 
primarily by the aerodynamic forces acting upon the broken aircraft rather than by 
the wind near the ground. Moreover, the cushion effects of the air beneath the 
aircraft and the sloped edge of the landfill further complicate the final trajectories 
of all size pieces and debris. 
It has been shown that the important winds affecting the aircraft during a 
final approach are tailwind or headwind shear, crosswind shear and downburst. 
50 
·······-..... /~.~--C?.~'.9.!' ... ~~-9.~~--60 FHI 
40 
2500 f H f 2000 1500 1000 
MA R S H 
·~ 
llll MSl 
AP PROACH 
LIGHT SYSTE M 
-Q 0 0 
M ARSH 
BASED ON 6- A, 7-A, USGS MA P 
Figure 38. Distribution of the debris and the location of the approach 
lights from Exhibits 6-A and 7-A. The estimated path of the accident 
Aircraft "L" was drawn by the author in an attempt to determine the 
low-level winds from debris distribution. The path could be different 
from the ones determined by aeronautica l methods after putting all 
debris together. 
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8. SPECULATION ON SPEARHEAJ) ECHOES 
The down.burst cells found inside the spearhead echo of the JFK Thunderstorm 
were different fran most downdraft cells seen inside the ordinary thunderstorm. 
Namely, the down.burst cells moved very fast while maintaining a very strong down-
ward current near the surface. 
According to "The Thllllderstorm '' (1949) most downdrafts originate at the 
height of the mid-troposphere. Dry air entrains into the downdraft from the side of 
the parent cloud (Figure 39). 
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Figure 39. Models of thunderstorm circulation. Downdrafts in most 
thunderstorms originate in mid-troposphere (left). The strato-
spheric air above the anvil level plunges into the downburst. 
In order to. explain the intense vertical current and the fast-traveling speed 
of downburst cells, the author postulated a downburst cell originating in the lower-
most stratosphere. The initial feature seen beyond the anvil-top level is the over-
shooting top which may reach 45, 000 to 70, 000 ft. When the top collapses, it 
undershoots into the anvil, transporting large horizontal momentum and dry air. 
One of the greatest sinking velocities of the collapsing tops measured from a 
Learjet airplane by Fujita (1974) was 41 m/sec or 92 mph. It is hard to believe 
that there could be such a strong downward current at the anvil level (Figure 40). 
Figure 40. An extremely fast, descending motion atop a Texas thunder-
~torm of May 6, 1973. A downward velocity of 41 m/ sec or 92 mph at 
48,000 ft was measured by use of a picture sequence taken every 
second while flying at 45,000 ft in a research Learjet. By. Fujita 
(1974). 
When an overshooting top rises and then collapses rapidly, a downburst cell 
will form on the downwind side of the dome. The cell has a tendency to travel fast 
because it is fed by fast-moving stratospheric air. A successive rise and fall of 
the top will create a family of. down.burst cells which moves away from the parent 
thllllderstorm (Figure 41). 
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On a PPI scope, the family of downburst cells might appear as a spearhead 
echo pointing downwind. From a close range, less than 30 miles , for instance, an 
airborne radar may be able to identify a downburst cell as being a circular area of 
rain. The pilot of Aircraft ''M" observed a circular cell, 2 to 3 miles in diameter, 
located over the approach end of runway 22-L. The time of observation was 2006 GMT, 
when "M" was following the accident Aircraft "L". 
During the damage survey of the April 3, 1974 tornado super-outbreak, the 
author witnessed from a low-flying Cessna airplane various patterns of tree damage. 
Some distance away from the tornado paths , trees in the forests were blown over in 
radial directions, as if they had been blown outward. It is suspected that these trees 
were pushed over or felled by strong winds which blew outward from the outburst 
center (Figure 42). 
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Figure 41. A model of spearhead echo. Being fed by the fast-moving, 
jet-stream air from above, downburst cells move faster than t he 
parent cloud. A family of downburst cells i n t heir various stages 
appears on radarscope as a spearhead-shaped echo. Low-humidity air 
is injected from the stratosphere, not from the side of the cloud . 
Figure 42. Over 300 trees blown over by an intense outburst near 
Beckley, West Virginia. Similar patterns of trees were photo-
graphed by the author at .numerous locatio.ns along the paths of 
tornadic thunderstorms of Apr~l 3, 1974, the day of . the super-
outbreak tornadoes. 
On May 6, 1975, the day of the Omaha tornado, WSR-57 radar of the National 
Weather Service at Kansas City, Missouri depicted a spearhead echo. The echo 
located approximately 100 nm south of the radar showed a feature of a spearhead 
pointing toward the east-southeast (Figure 43). 
A geostationary satellite picture taken at 2222 GMT, the time of the radar 
picture shows an overshooting top. When the radar and satellite pictures were com-
bined into a single image, it is evident that the overshooting top and the spearhead 
echo coincided very well in terms of their locations. 
Figure 43 . Features of a spearhead echo 100 nm to the south of Kansas 
City, Mo. on May 6, 1975. Radar echoes at 2222 GMT (left) SMS 
picture at 2222 GMT (center), and their combination. ' 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
The research results and the speculation regarding the phenomena presented 
in this paper suggest the existence of downburst cells in specific thmderstorms. 
These cells are lilcely to be characterized by spearhead echoes, a definition newly 
introduced in this paper. About 23 of the echoes in the New York area, the principal 
site involved in this research, were spearhead echoes. 
The detection of downburst cells is very difficult because of their small sizes 
and short duration. Their existence might be identified by the following means. 
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1. Operate additional anemometers near the approach end of the active 
runway. 
2. Both windspeed and directions must be monitored continuously during 
a thunderstorm , especially when a sea or lake breeze exists. 
3. Continuously monitor the shape and motion of radar echoes. The 
development of monitoring techniques and display equipment is 
essential to adequately accomplish this. 
4. The continuous monitoring of the cloud top activities. Development of 
a storm -detection satellite capable of watching cloud tops continuously, 
both day and night, by use of infrared and other sensors is recommended. 
The detection and identification of any downburst cells that constitute a potential 
hazard to approaching and landing aircraft, will be of little use unless procedures are 
developed for the immediate communication of this information to the pilots of those 
aircraft. The rate of change of such cells would require their uninterrupted analysis, 
through the use of radar, mesometeorological analysis, surface wind information 
in the approach zone, etc., in order to properly evaluate the thunderstorm without 
unnecessarily disrupting the approach and landing of aircraft at a particular airport. 
Once downburst cells are identified as being a potential hazard to approaching 
aircraft, the air traffic controllers, and the pilots, would have to talce immediate 
action. The author is not qualified as an aviation authority, but suggests that the 
nature of downburst cells and the effects of wind shear would indicate the desirability 
of such action as : 
1. Use of a runway which is not being affected by the downburst cell 
or the wind shear, if possible. 
2. The air traffic controllers should advise a 2 to 3 minute delay in 
landing or talceo:ff when a strong cell is located near the approach 
or departure end. 
3. The pilots of approaching aircraft should prepare to go around as soon 
as the effects of downburst and/ or outburst is suspected. 
4. A study should be made and the procedures tested for the proper 
control of the aircraft altitude to stop the sinking motion when a 
downburst is encountered. 
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GLOSSARY OF NEW TERMS 
by 
H. R. Byers and T. T. Fujita 
November 1975 
DOWNBURST - A localized, intense downdraft with vertical currents exceeding 
a downward speed of 12 fps or 720 fpm at 300 ft above the surface. This 
-2 -1 
value corresponds to a divergence of 4 x 10 sec . 
SPEARHEAD ECHO - A radar echo with a pointed appendage extending toward 
the direction of the echo motion. The appendage moves much faster than 
the parent echo which is being drawn into the appendage. Downburst cells 
are most likely to be found in a spearhead echo. 
WIND SHEAR - Meteorological definition is the spatial variation of the wind 
vector or its components in a given direction and distance. The direction 
can be either horizontal, vertical, or their combinations. 
a. Vertical variation of horizontal winds (vertical wind shear) 
b. Horizontal variation of vertical winds (shear in vertical velocity) 
c. Horizontal variation of horizontal winds (horizontal wind shear) 
The term wind shear in aviation i s the variation of the wind vector or its 
components along the flight path. 
a. Variation of crosswinds (crosswind shear) 
b. Variation of vertical winds (vertical wind shear) 
c . Variation of headwinds or tailwinds (headwind or tailwind shear) 
OUTBURST CENTER - The nadir point of a downburst where the vertical air 
current hits the surface and spreads out violently. The fastest spreading 
flow is seen in the direction of the cell motion. Environmental flows , such 
as sea breeze and adjacent cells distort the outburst current. Depending 
upon the flight path relative to an outburst center, the outburst current is 
felt by an aircraft as 
a . Crosswind burs t - - Aircraft drifts to the right or left. 
b. Tailwind burst - - Indicated airspeed drops and aircraft sinks. 
c. Headwind burst - - Indicated airs peed increases and aircraft 
gains altitude. 
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